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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 16, 1996, a quadruple homicide devastated the town of Winona,
Mississippi. Four employees of Tardy Furniture, a Winona institution, had
been shot in the head execution-style in the middle of the day. With almost
no evidence except for shoe prints and bullet casings, investigators
scrambled to identify the perpetrator. Ultimately, the investigation focused
on one person: Curtis Flowers, an African-American ex-employee of Tardy
Furniture. Flowers was eventually tried six times for the Tardy Furniture
quadruple homicide. Three times, a jury convicted Flowers and sentenced
him to death, only to be reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court due to
prosecutorial misconduct.1 In 2019, with its decision in Flowers v.
Mississippi,2 the Supreme Court vacated Flowers’s conviction and death
sentence for the murders, finding the prosecutor at his trial had unlawfully
used race as a basis for peremptorily striking potential jurors.3 This was the
sixth time Flowers had been convicted and sentenced for the Tardy
Furniture murders, and the fourth time a conviction was vacated because of
race-based strikes.4
While not a constitutional right, the peremptory challenge was, for five
hundred years, reserved as a fundamental right solely for criminal
defendants.5 The peremptory challenge is a tool used by litigants to strike,
without cause, qualified jurors from serving on the jury panel.6 It is a longvenerated tool, and coupled with it are the sacrosanct, constitutional rights
1. See Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007) (asserting the State’s intentional
discrimination in jury selection warrants vacating the conviction); see also Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d
531, 538 (Miss. 2003) (vacating conviction due to various errors, including findings of prosecutorial
misconduct); see also Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 334 (Miss. 2000) (finding the Mississippi Circuit
Court erred in overruling the Batson challenge).
2. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
3. Id. at 2235.
4. Id. The fourth and fifth trials ended in mistrials. Id.
5. A draft of the Sixth Amendment included peremptory challenges solely for defendants as a
measure of ensuring fair trials. Though this provision was not included in the final draft, peremptory
challenges remained a central concern resulting in Congress formally granting defendants the right of
peremptory challenge in federal cases in 1790. See John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and
Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (2005) (discussing
the history of peremptory challenges).
6. See Jeb C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind Questionnaire: The Most Practical Solution for Ending
the Problem of Racial and Gender Discrimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the Necessary Function of the
Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 324–27 (2002) (“The basic premise of not
disclosing a reason for eliminating a juror is why the peremptory challenge was created—in order to
enhance the prospect of sitting an impartial jury.”).
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governing the jury as a whole.7 Thus, history demonstrates, while “the
peremptory challenge . . . enjoys a strong link to the right to a fair trial,” the
concentration of this link was for five hundred years was intended to protect
the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.8
It would not be until the mid-nineteenth century that states would grant
a more restricted right to peremptory challenges to prosecutors.9 Some
argued this in direct response to the Thirteenth Amendment as a way of
ensuring a restriction on African-Americans’ ability to serve on a jury,
despite the right guaranteed by the Constitution.10 Through the midtwentieth century, the peremptory challenge tool created jury panels of rich
white men, as these were “members of a reasonably elite group of propertied
men . . . .”11 However, as eligibility requirements for jury service
broadened, jury panels became more diverse.12 Prosecutors, in particular,
used challenges as a way to prevent Black jurors from serving.13 Of course,
7. The United States Constitution grants that any trial except for impeachment “shall be by
Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution expands on that
right by including the right to “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 1.
8. See Francis, supra note 5, at 300–05 (“[H]istory demonstrates that it is a defendant’s right.”).
9. See id. at 302 (explaining prosecutors were generally given fewer peremptory strikes when
states granted this right).
10. See id. at 304 (“The challenge could be used to exclude African Americans from jury service,
even though the Thirteenth Amendment, in principal, guaranteed this right to black Americans.”).
11. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 165 (1989); see also Jean Montoya, The Future of the PostBatson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
981, 982 (1996) (“This method of jury selection worked for a time, at least as long as jury panels were
comprised of affluent white men.”).
12. See Montoya, supra note 11, at 982 (explaining the changing use of the peremptory challenge
due to more diverse jury pools). Diverse juries were the nightmare for white Southerners, who
“conceived black jury service ‘as a form of political officeholding,’ and for . . . several decades, the
battle to integrate the jury box was a critical and constant feature of Southern politics.” Activism to
end “the Jim Crow Jury” stretched nationwide. Thomas W. Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 1593, 1600–10 (2018).
13. Even after the Batson decision, prosecutors devised—and publicized—ways to circumvent
the requirement of race-neutral explanations due to the prominent belief that “good jur[ies]” won cases
and “good jury lawyers” were essential. See, e.g., Jack McMahon, Jury Selection with Jack McMahon,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ag2I-L3mqsQ [https://perma.cc/
ML8E-U43V] (emphasis added). In a video published shortly after the Batson decision, Pennsylvania
prosecutor Jack McMahon acknowledged that any lawyer must play by the rules, but also explained:
“The best thing I can suggest is make a code for yourself . . . And you all do your own little code to know what
that particular response means. . . . Whatever it is for you.” Id. McMahon further described the
individual questioning by the prosecution as relating to the code previously written. Id. He went on
to say:
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Black jurors’ fear was, and is, based on stereotypes about their ability to
serve.14 The use of “stereotypes is a virtually inherent aspect of a system of
peremptory challenges.”15 The use of the peremptory challenge thus
became a tool for race and gender discrimination.16
It was the Court’s hope, through Batson v. Kentucky,17 to correct this use
of peremptory challenges by establishing “[p]urposeful racial discrimination
in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
However, Batson created a secondary problem—the
secure.”18
“enforcement nightmare”—by requiring a defendant to have a prima facie
case showing discrimination before a prosecutor would provide his required
“neutral explanation” for striking the juror in question.19 In addition to the

When you have a juror that you obviously like by just their appearance, okay, it’s . . . at this critical
stage is how you phrase your questions. If it’s this wonderful looking common law juror, the guy
that would hang his mother, you know, if she did anything . . . you want to ask the questions in a
fashion that’s gonna make them not answer it in a way that’s gonna get them excused for
cause. . . . You lead the witness . . . . This is somebody you want as a juror.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson v. Kentucky: Reflections Inspired by a Podcast, 105 KY. L.J. 621,
630 (2016) [hereinafter Marder, Reflections Inspired by a Podcast] (noting, in an interview with the podcast,
prosecutor Jack McMahon told Marder that he “believes African-Americans are more likely to question
police testimony and so he uses peremptories to remove them.”); see also Antony Page, Batson’s BlindSpot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U.L. REV. 155, 156 (2005) (arguing “the
Batson peremptory challenge framework is woefully ill-suited to address the problem of race and
gender discrimination in jury selection” due to an attorney’s implicit bias); see also Joshua C. Polster,
From Proving Pretext to Proving Discrimination: The Real Lesson of Miller-El and Snyder, 81 MISS. L.J. 491,
493 (2012) (“Historically, prosecutors used challenges to eliminate African-American veniremembers,
who they theorized were unfit for service and would be sympathetic to black defendants.”).
15. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 452 (1996). But see Laurel Johnson, The Peremptory Paradox: A
Look at Peremptory Challenges and the Advantageous Possibilities They Provide, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 215,
223 (2015) (emphasis added) (“While there are disadvantages associated with the use of
peremptories . . . they have long been utilized as a valuable tool in the creation of impartial juries.”).
16. See Montoya, supra note 11, at 982 (discussing the unfair and biased uses of peremptory
challenges); see also Polster, supra note 14, at 493 (“[A]s much scholarship has argued, peremptory
challenges are still used by some prosecutors as vehicles for discrimination.”).
17. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
18. Id. at 86.
19. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 169 (addressing issues associated with peremptory challenges
post-Batson); Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. But see Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated: How the Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
607, 611 (2005) (arguing Batson “is a special type of enforcement mechanism, one that differs from the
rest by accurately and immediately policing wrongdoing.”).
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obvious issue of how to rise to the evidentiary burden, a prosecutor could
easily furnish a so-called race-neutral explanation for his strike—known as
pretextual reasoning20—or the reasoning could be such that it is “a close
proxy for race.”21
Perhaps nowhere are these issues more clearly displayed than in the 2019
case of Flowers v. Mississippi and its history. The prosecutor’s actions in
Flowers I-VI represents the worst of what the peremptory challenge can be—
unbridled prosecutorial misconduct four (arguably six) times over—and
exemplifies why a fresh discussion of the system of peremptory strikes is
central to the criminal justice system. This Comment will present the history
of the peremptory challenge, specifically identifying its influences before
and after Batson.
Using Flowers, in particularly the dissent by
Justice Clarence Thomas, this Comment will present the argument for and
against abolishing the peremptory challenge system. It will also present
alternatives to abolishment. Despite the Court’s attempts to rid the jury
selection of racial (and other forms of) discrimination, the peremptory
challenge system remains one of “undisguised racial discrimination” and
should be abolished.22
II. HISTORY OF THE STRIKE
A. Peremptory Challenges Before Batson
In contrast to the English system, which utilized peremptory challenges
were rarely used and abolished them entirely in 1988, use “flourished in the
20. Pretext is defined as “[a] false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or
strong reason or motive.” Pretext, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). An example of
pretextual reasoning is a North Carolina “cheat sheet” used by prosecutors in the 1990s, which listed
“approved reasons for minority strikes,” including “such reasons as ‘lack of eye contact,’ ‘air of
defiance,’ ‘arms folded,’ ‘leaning away from the questioner,’ and ‘evasive.’” Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany
P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C.L.
REV. 1957, 1980 (2016).
21. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 174–75; see also Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12,
at 1626–27 (“[I]t makes it painfully easy to cloak even the most overt forms of racism through
pretextual race-neutral justifications . . . .”).
22. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 167; see also Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed
Opportunity for Batson and the Peremptory Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2017) [hereinafter
Marder, A Missed Opportunity for Batson] (“[I]n the end the only way to eliminate discriminatory
peremptory challenges is to eliminate the peremptory challenge.”); see also Jere W. Morehead, When A
Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination
from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 641 (1994) (arguing peremptory challenges are inherently
biased and the Court should abolish them entirely).
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United States.”23 In the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War, it was
not uncommon for states to have laws directly preventing AfricanAmericans from serving on a jury by ensuring they could not qualify.24 In
Strauder v. West Virginia,25 the Supreme Court found such a statute
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds and overturned the
corresponding conviction due to the resulting all-white jury.26 As a
workaround to outright unconstitutional laws, some states designed laws
predicated on excluding jurors on other, more nebulous grounds.27 The
Supreme Court’s response to laws “using white stereotypes of black
characteristics as criteria for service,” was not unconstitutional because race
was not “enumerated as a factor” specifically.28 These discretionary laws
were not unconstitutional because “it ha[d] not been shown that their actual
administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.”29 This
would be a striking statement except that equal protection challenges require
a finding of intent, which makes bringing cases like a Batson challenge so
difficult in the first place.30
The requirement of intentional discrimination paralyzes any judicial
inquiry when a case does not involve explicit racism, leading to an ineffective
review of contextual facts that could demonstrate intentional
discrimination.31 Instead of identifying a particular wrong, equal protection
23. Caren M. Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
10–11 (2014).
24. Francis, supra note 5, at 306.
25. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
26. See Francis, supra note 5, at 306 (explaining the Court’s reasoning and the rights granted
under the Fourteenth Amendment). Despite the seemingly positive move forward, “Black activists
had no trouble identifying and critiquing the emerging Equal Protection framework as inadequate to
ensure equitable black participation on juries.” Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1607.
27. See Francis, supra note 5, at 306–07 (describing the 1892 Mississippi law providing “three
state officials with the power to select jurors based on their ‘good intelligence, sound judgment and fair
character.’”).
28. Id. at 306.
29. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
30. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Non-Discrimination Ideal of Hernandez v. Texas Confronts a
“Culture” of Discrimination: The Amazing Story of Miller-El v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 97,
116 (2005) (“Proving that the exclusion is the product of intentional discrimination is a real challenge
for defendants.”); see also Polster, supra note 14, at 493–94 (“Much of the inability of courts to detect
discrimination can be attributed to the inherent difficulty of distinguishing when a challenge is based
on a prediction that a prospective juror will be unfavorable and when a challenge is based on race.”).
31. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986) (“A recurring question in these cases, as in
any case alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the defendant had met his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State.”); see also Page, supa note 14,
at 181–82 (“Motivation, intent, purpose, and, most importantly, conscious awareness . . . are not
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challenges must show an intentional wrong, changing the scope and level of
judicial scrutiny by asking judges to assess the prosecutor’s heart.32 Thus, a
judge may not hear evidence exemplifying how implicit bias in making a
peremptory strike may equal intentional bias and, therefore, intentional
discrimination.33 Proving intentional discrimination will very rarely be easy
because everyone is, or at least should be, aware that they must avoid
showing exactly this in making any peremptory strikes.34
Racial discrimination within the peremptory challenge system did not
become a significant issue until the Civil Rights Act of 1875 when AfricanThe racial
Americans were increasingly called to jury service.35
discrimination of the justice system thus evolved from “explicit statutory
bans on African-American participation in jury service to strategic but no
less blatant uses of peremptory challenges.”36 As a result, “[t]he Jim Crow
jury never fully fell.”37
necessary pre-requisites for stereotyping and any resulting discrimination.”); see also Polster, supra
note 14, at 494–95 (arguing prosecutors may “explain their challenges with strategic reasons,” based
on “background, demeanor, and statements during voir dire . . . defendants generally cannot show that
[the reasons] are inaccurate.”).
32. Justice Thomas’s Flowers dissent provides an interesting example of this paradox.
Justice Thomas argued that “Flowers presented no evidence whatsoever of purposeful race
discrimination by the State . . . .” But, in his determination that there was no intentional discrimination,
he pointed only to the final race-neutral reasoning of the State as sufficient, despite a clear pattern of
behavior designed to keep African-Americans from the final jury panel. In other words, because the
State provided exactly what Batson proscribed—any race-neutral reason—the path it took to get to that
reason hardly matters. Thomas was adamant this is the case even when factors may show
discriminatory intent because “the bare numbers are meaningless outside the context of the reasons for
the strikes.” For Justice Thomas, judicial review of Batson challenges begins and ends with the raceneutral reason. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2269 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Any other
“reliance on race-neutral strikes to show discrimination is judicial alchemy.” Id. at 2255–57 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 2273 (“Peremptory strikes are designed to protect against fears of partiality by giving
effect to the parties’ intuitions about jurors’ often-unstated biases.”) (emphasis added).
34. See Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge
of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 547 (1999) (“Any experienced trial attorney will
know better than to state any preference for or aversion to a particular race, gender, or ethnicity. The
same trial lawyers will know how to undermine any trial judge’s attempted examination of the unstated
or subconscious.”); see also Polster, supra note 14, at 495 (“Judicial focus on defendants’ ability to prove
that reasons are pretextual thereby effectively prevents most defendants from proving
discrimination.”).
35. Morrison, supra note 23, at 11.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1620; see also Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory
Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 827–30 (1997) (arguing
the peremptory challenge is the “[l]ast [b]est [t]ool of Jim Crow.”).
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The first challenge to peremptories at the Supreme Court came in Swain
v. Alabama,38 a decision addressing whether denying African-Americans the
right to sit on a jury violated equal protection. In Swain, an AfricanAmerican man was sentenced to death by an all-white jury created by the
liberal use of peremptory strikes of every African-American potential juror.
The Court reaffirmed the “State’s purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes
on account of race of participation as jurors . . . violates the Equal
Protection Clause[,]” but also reaffirmed its use of peremptories to
“demonstrate the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a
necessary part of trial by jury.”39 The Court imposed a high burden of
proof on any defendant claiming an Equal Protection violation, requiring a
showing of “the prosecutor’s systematic use of peremptory challenges
against Negroes over a period of time.”40 The high burden of proof
practically ensured defendants would encounter significant obstacles in
proving a discrimination case, not the least of which was the requirement
that discrimination had to continue for some time before rising to the level
of a violation.41 As a result, the peremptory challenge remained the “last
bastion of undisguised racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system.”42
B. The Batson Challenge
After Swain, the landscape for the peremptory challenges was clear,
though difficult: the systematic use of strikes on a race basis had to be
proven by the defendant.43 Batson effectively changed this landscape.44
James Batson, an African-American man, was charged with burglary.45
During voir dire, the prosecutor struck all four Black potential jurors,
leading to an all-white jury.46 Defense counsel immediately objected,
arguing this violated Mr. Batson’s right to equal protection via the
Fourteenth Amendment.47 However, the Court’s hands were tied—Swain’s
38. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. Id. at 204, 219.
40. Id. at 227.
41. Id.
42. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 167.
43. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227
44. See Appleman, supra note 19, at 608 (“Properly understood, the Batson procedure enforces a
normative framework of legal ethics, providing an aspirational standard for the legal profession.”).
45. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
46. Id. at 83.
47. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/7

8

Viteo: “We” the Jury

2020]

COMMENT

231

decision specifically created a right only where discriminatory strikes could
be proven as used over a period of time.48 Mr. Batson claimed
discrimination only within his own case.49 In “[r]ecognizing this assault on
the constitutional principle of equality, the United States Supreme Court in
Batson v. Kentucky sought to end the unbridled use of peremptory challenges
as a tool for racial discrimination.”50
The Batson Court faced head-on the challenging burden of proof laid at
the feet of any defendant.51 In doing so, the Court revised its approach to
the question of purposeful discrimination.52 In answer to Mr. Batson’s
complaint, the Court re-examined Swain and reaffirmed Strauder v. West
Virginia.53 Strauder “laid the foundation for the Court’s unceasing efforts to
eradicate racial discrimination . . . [and e]xclusion of black citizens from
service as jurors constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to cure.”54 Per Swain, if the presumption was
without proof of historical discrimination, the Court would presume the
peremptory strikes were appropriate.55 Batson instead prescribed that a trial
judge must apply a three-step analysis to assess whether a violation
occurred:56
[T]he defendant [first] must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
48. Id. at 84.
49. Id.
50. Mikal C. Watts & Emily C. Jeffcott, A Primer on Batson, Including Discussion of Johnson v.
California, Miller-El v. Dretke, Rice v. Collins, & Snyder v. Louisiana, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 337, 341
(2011).
51. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (highlighting the Court’s history of addressing the issue).
52. Id. at 90.
53. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (reaffirming equal
protection guarantees the State will not exclude jurors on account of race and rejecting any restriction
by the principles of Swain to systematic conduct over more than one case).
54. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. But see William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but
Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 110 (1987) (“[The Court’s] opinion in Batson turned not on
the Sixth Amendment issue, but instead on the Equal Protection Clause . . . this development produced
some background skirmishing in the opinions over the propriety of the Court’s resolving an important
issue . . . other than that on which certiorari had been granted.”).
55. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (explaining the presumption of validity of preemptory strikes
outlined in Swain).
56. See id. at 95 (“[T]he trial court must undertake a ‘factual inquiry’ that ‘takes into account all
possible explanatory factors’ in the particular case.”).
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selection practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.” Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
This combination of factors . . . raises the necessary inference of purposeful
discrimination.57

Assuming the defendant has successfully made a prima facie showing that a
violation occurred, it is then the State’s burden to supply a race-neutral
reason for why the juror was struck specific to the case at hand.58 Finally,
it is the trial court’s responsibility to adjudicate if purposeful discrimination
was shown.59 However, although the prosecutor bears the small
responsibility of advancing neutral reasons, the burden of proof remains
with the challenger.60
The Batson holding was not without its immediate detractors.61
Chief Justice Burger confronted the requirement of race-neutral explanation
as essentially eliminating the true peremptory strike, proposing that in doing
so, “exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish from a challenge
for cause.”62 Beyond his fear that this effectively eliminated the peremptory
challenge from “the fabric of our jury system,” Chief Justice Burger was
additionally concerned the case would cause enormous logistical

57. Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id. at 98.
60. See id. at 90 (“A recurring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, was whether the defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination on the part of the State.”); see also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2268 (2019)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The challenger] bears the burden of proving racial discrimination . . . .”).
61. See Montoya, supra note 11, at 992 (“These Justices also predict doom for the
implementation of Batson. Their more notable assertions are that Batson interjects racial matters into
the jury selection process . . . [and] effectively abolishes the peremptory challenge . . . .”). But see
Melynda J. Price, Expanding Reach: The Importance of Batson v. Kentucky Thirty Years On, 105 KY. L.J.
609, 618 (2017) (“Even with very strong dissents over the years, the Court has stayed the course in
Batson.”).
62. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, J., dissenting). Scholarship has echoed this concern, arguing
Batson’s decision effectively makes the real issue not that discrimination was present, but “whether the
criteria upon which the discriminations are based are reasonable and acceptable.” Melilli, supra note 15,
at 449; see Marder, A Missed Opportunity for Batson, supra note 22, at 1140 (“Batson was a noble effort to
maintain the peremptory challenge and to eliminate discrimination during jury selection, but
discriminatory peremptory challenges endure.”); see also Pizzi, supra note 54, at 115 (“[T]he decisions of
the litigants in a particular case to strike prospective jurors stands on a different footing. . . . [with]
limited information about the prospective jurors.”).
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complications for trial courts.63 Even further, Chief Justice Burger was
concerned that Batson created a secondary problem of how the principle of
equal protection extended—to discrimination based on sex, age, religion,
and possibly further?64 In some sense, Chief Justice Burger’s Batson dissent
foretold the roadmap for post-Batson issues and cases.65
Chief Justice Burger also pinpointed the major problem with Batson—it
tries to do too much with too little, and as a result, “attempts to decree a
middle ground.”66 The “middle ground” Chief Justice Burger refers is the
conflation of the challenge for cause and the race-neutral reasoning.67
Chief Justice Burger envisioned that the peremptory challenge the Batson
Court described would be “a challenge for cause that [is] just a little bit
arbitrary—but not too much.”68 The question then becomes: what is the
“right” amount of arbitrary?69
In forcing this issue through its three-part framework, Batson overlooks—
or outright ignores—implicit bias in jury selection.70 When challenged,
counsel must provide race-neutral reasoning; however, counsel may
effectively provide any arbitrary reason, discriminatory or not.71 This could
be because counsel understands stating a clearly discriminatory
rationalization is effectively a path to nowhere except possible sanction and
bias against their own case; however, it may also be because counsel does
63. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 130, 133 (“This process is sure to tax even the most capable counsel
and judges . . . .”); see also Cavise, supra note 34, at 541 (“The failure of Batson becomes almost
scandalous when one takes into account the procedural morass it has created in the trial courtrooms
and the clogged dockets in the appellate courts.”).
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, J., dissenting).
65. See Pizzi, supra note 54, at 115 (predicting future cases by asserting “limit[ing] the holding of
the case to cognizable racial groups was inconsistent with settled equal protection law which
required . . . exten[sion] beyond racial groups to embrace exclusions . . . on the basis of sex, religious
or political affiliation . . . and so on”).
66. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, J., dissenting).
67. See id. (arguing the two will ultimately be “difficult to distinguish” from one another).
68. Id. at 128.
69. See Page, supra note 14, at 158 (“The difficult question was how to reconcile the dictates of
the Constitution with the tradition of the unfettered ‘arbitrary and capricious’ peremptory challenge.”).
70. See Morrison, supra note 23, at 31 (“Batson rests on outdated and inaccurate assumptions
about human behavior—assumptions that were recognized as problematic even at the time.”); see also
Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Custom Fit: Tailoring Texas Civil Jury Selection Procedures to Case Tiers, 43 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 495, 516–17 (2012) (“Basically, an attorney is permitted to exercise peremptory challenges based
entirely on hunches and stereotypes, and such motivations are outside the court’s control.”); see also
Griebat, supra note 6, at 325 (“Bias or partiality stems from one’s state of mind or psychographic
features such as attitude[] and mental impressions . . . .”).
71. See Hoffman, supra note 37, at 140 (“Peremptory challenges are a combination of psychiatry
and palm reading, which probably overlap greatly anyway.”).
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not recognize how their own methods of jury selection may be
discriminatory due to their own implicit biases or biased methods.72
Cognitive research has shown that people automatically categorize others
upon first contact and use the most salient characteristics, such as race and
gender, to do so.73
While counsel’s eventual reason may be facially race-neutral, the methods
by which counsel arrived at said reason might be discriminatory, including
disparate questioning and the use of jury shuffling.74 Disparate questioning
is an especially common method to arrive at “race-neutral” reasoning where
counsel asks minority prospective jurors more, or different, questions
during voir dire than white prospective jurors. This heavy questioning will
inevitably lead to a “race-neutral” reason, though these “often correlate with
race . . . or the reasons are simply specious . . . .”75 Therefore, a judge may
accept a strike as race-neutral due to a minority juror having a tenuous
connection with the prosecutor’s office by virtue of family or friends having
been prosecuted, but that race-neutral reason may only exist due to counsel
excessively questioning minorities based upon the stereotype of their likely
connection to criminal activity.76 Counsel may not even recognize their
methods or questioning as discriminatory and honestly believe the race72. This creates a fundamental paradox for counsel:
[A]sking lawyers to identify their own implicit biases is “at best uninformative and at worst
misleading.” If a lawyer is unaware of how a juror’s race has affected her decision to strike, she
will be unable to explain it. Conversely, if she is aware that race informed her decision to strike,
she will have the double incentive of not losing the strike by admitting that race was a factor and
the generally shared desire not to appear racially biased.
Morrison, supra note 23, at 32 (quoting Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection,
63 AM. PSYCH. 527, 532 (2008)); see also Page, supra note 14, at 160 (asserting everyone, including
attorneys, are affected by stereotypes, “even if people do not consciously allow these stereotypes to
affect their judgment”). But see Appleman, supra note 19, at 624 (arguing “Batson provides a forum in
which to establish a norm that discourages unconscious discrimination, while promoting attorneys’
efforts to overcome it . . . [by virtue of] Batson’s ethical imperative . . . [that] compel[s] ethical behavior
from prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel”).
73. More disturbingly, the same research shows that not only do “people automatically
categorize,” but also “with the result that many Americans show automatic preference for white
over black.” Morrison, supra note 23, at 30–31 (emphasis added).
74. See Polster, supra note 14, at 503 (arguing guidebooks often instruct in how to build a jury
“consider[ing] . . . race,” and jury experts advise on how to achieve the best “demographic”).
75. See Thompson, supra note 30, at 117 (explaining “involve[ment] in the criminal justice
system,” “living or working in a high crime area,” and “[various] socio-economic factors” are racially
coded and often not race-neutral reasons).
76. See generally id. at 118 (“The high rate of involvement by African-Americans in the criminal
justice system means that this reason will correlate strongly with race.”).
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neutral reason is a justified, sufficient strike.77 This is a crucial problem in
the Batson framework—“its inability to address the honest, well-intentioned
lawyer who nevertheless still discriminates.”78
C. The Peremptory Challenge After Batson
1.

Batson’s Expansion of Applicability and Race-Neutrality

In the years after the “Batson challenge” was established, a slew of subissues came to the Court’s attention fairly rapidly, centralizing around where
and to whom Batson applied. In 1991, Powers v. Ohio79 established that the
defendant raising the challenge need not be of the same race as the struck
juror.80 Also in 1991, Hernandez v. New York81 established that the Batson
challenge extended to Latinos.82 That year also saw Batson’s extension to
civil cases.83 By 1994, the Court also held the equal protection principles
of Batson extended to gender.84
In addition to cases regarding to whom Batson was applicable, the Court
decided precisely what a race-neutral reason could be.85 Hernandez
expanded the race-neutral reason as early as 1991 to include even those
decisions resulting in discriminatory impact.86 A race-neutral reason could
thus be anything, so long as it was not made with discriminatory purpose.87
The issue of race-neutrality in peremptory strikes is then one of facial
77. See Page, supra note 14, at 180 (“Such unconscious discrimination occurs, almost inevitably,
because of normal cognitive processes that form stereotypes.”).
78. Id. at 179.
79. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
80. See id. at 402 (holding a defendant may make objections to prospective jurors being excluded
on the basis of race regardless if defendant and jurors are of different race).
81. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
82. See id. at 369–70 (concluding the prosecutor’s statement of doubt that Latino prospective
jurors would rely on official Spanish translations was not discrimination based on race).
83. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“Racial discrimination
has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.”).
84. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994) (“[G]ender-based peremptory
challenges cannot survive the heightened equal protection scrutiny that this Court affords distinctions
based on gender.”). Though the end-result of J.E.B. is positive in its extension of protection to gender,
the Court yet again “failed to provide a sufficient standard for judges to apply when evaluating suspect
explanations.” Nancy J. Cutler, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Excellent Ideology, Ineffective Implementation,
26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 503, 521 (1994).
85. See Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 345–46 (arguing Batson cases before 2005 allowed
greater use of the Batson challenge while simultaneously limiting it as well).
86. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359–60 (1991).
87. Id. at 360.
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validity, and “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”88 In
Hernandez, the allegedly race-neutral reason was language, a reason that
would plainly disproportionally affect people of color. However, although
the prosecutor’s reasoning was specifically related to the fact that a potential
juror spoke Spanish, the Court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation that
his concern was not race, but doubt that a juror who did not speak English
would rely on translators rather than his own memory.89
The Court took the concept of facial neutrality in race-neutral reasoning
even further in Purkett v. Elem,90 asserting not only must the challenged
reason be no more than facially valid, but also it need not be “persuasive, or
even plausible.”91 The Purkett Court found any argument for the raceneutral reason’s persuasiveness to be inapplicable until the third and final
Batson step, where “a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious
reason” rather than requiring the Batson challenge to end at step two.92 As
a result of the cases above, “by 2005, the Supreme Court had modified
Batson’s framework by expanding the availability of Batson under step one
while simultaneously limiting, and thereby perhaps eviscerating, its practical
utility under steps two and three.”93
2.

Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under Batson

In Johnson v. California,94 the Court was once again asked to establish the
parameters of a prima facie case under Batson’s principles.95 At trial, defense
counsel made two separate objections due to the prosecutor’s peremptory
strikes of three individual Black jurors, leaving an all-white jury.96 After
each objection, the trial judge reasoned the defense had not presented a
“strong likelihood” that the strikes were based on group bias without asking
88. Id.
89. See id. (finding the prosecutor’s “doubt [in the juror’s] ability to defer to official translation”
was sufficiently race-neutral despite petitioner’s arguments that the focus on the Spanish language itself
was essentially a proxy for race discrimination).
90. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
91. Id. at 768.
92. See id. at 768 (asserting ending a Batson challenge inquiry at step two “violates the principle
that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from,
the opponent of the strike.”).
93. Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50 at 347.
94. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
95. See id. at 168 (addressing if whether a peremptory strike was “more likely than not” a result
of bias was a sufficient standard of review).
96. Id. at 164.
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the prosecutor for race-neutral explanations.97 The Court held a “more
likely than not” standard of review was inappropriate as to the first step
under Batson: establishing a prima facie case based on facts giving “rise to an
inference of discriminatory purpose.”98 Importantly, the Court further held
the intention of the Batson first step was not to be so difficult to establish as
to foreclose “Batson challenges” entirely; rather, adequate evidence giving
rise to even an inference of discrimination provided for the burden to shift to
the State to explain any strike(s).99
This “burden-shifting framework” thus “assumed . . . that the trial judge
would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances . . . before deciding
whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly
motivated.”100 The “more likely than not” standard of review adopted by
Johnson was thus for Batson step three only.101 However, later in the Court’s
opinion, it reaffirmed a central piece established within Purkett—the burden
of persuasion never shifts from the defendant.102 Despite the dangers
racially biased jury selection present to the overall administration of justice,
the Court suggested these may all be solved by merely directly questioning
the prosecutor, even while it recognized that the State could easily produce
a “frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification for its strike.”103
D. Peremptory Challenges After Miller
The inherent tension in identifying racial discrimination in a discretionary
process came strongly to the fore in the Miller-El cases.104 In that case, the
Court first considered expanding Batson in Miller-El v. Cockrell105 (MillerEl I), where ten of eleven eligible Black jurors were struck in the capital
97. The trial judge did warn the prosecutor, indicating they were “very close.” Id. at 165.
98. Id. at 168–69 (2005); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986).
99. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 171.
102. Id. at 170–71; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
103. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171, 172 (“The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of
discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct
answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.”).
104. See Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 350 (“[R]ecogniz[ing] ‘the practical difficulty of
ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature.’”).
105. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). This was later reaffirmed by the Court. Rice v.
Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2005); see Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 356–57 (“Thus, Snyder and Rice
establish that, unless the cold record states the trial court’s basis for a credibility determination, a
reviewing court cannot defer to such a finding and can uphold the trial court’s step three determination
only where another proffered reason is deemed nondiscriminatory.”).
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murder trial of a Black defendant, Tomas Joe Miller-El.106 The Miller-El I
Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals after concluding the
petitioner had, in fact, presented significant evidence of pretext.107 The
Court firmly established that while deference is necessary when evaluating
the trial court’s decision, it “does not imply abandonment or abdication . . .
[and] does not by definition preclude relief.”108 Most importantly, the
Miller-El I court laid the foundation for recognizing the problem of implicit
bias even in the face of race-neutral reasoning.109 Specifically, Miller-El I
envisioned an inquiry by which the prosecutor’s “state of mind” is of
particular importance.
The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, which again found no
Batson violation. When the case once again reached the Court in Miller-El v.
Dretke110 (Miller-El II), the Court’s frustration with the deferential analysis
given by the Court of Appeals came through clearly.111 For the first time,
the Court provided “non-exhaustive, yet illustrative factors” in determining
whether a peremptory strike resulted from discriminatory pretext.112 The
factors of Miller-El II recognize the difficulty of identifying pretext precisely
because it is not usually blatant or as easy as counsel proffering an openly
discriminatory reason when a strike is challenged. These five factors
include, but are not limited to: (1) statistical analysis; (2) direct comparisons
between struck Black jurors and white members of the jury panel;
(3) disparate questioning; (4) jury shuffling; and (5) counsel’s history of
strikes.113 Miller-El II also entered the territory of implicit bias, building on
the groundwork of Miller-El I, by acknowledging race: “the implication of
106. Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 350; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 326.
107. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341 (“[T]he District Court did not give full consideration to the
substantial evidence petitioner put forth in support of the prima facie case.”). In Miller-El I, 90.9% of
African-American jurors were challenged versus every other juror at 12.9%, making an AfricanAmerican “7 times more likely to be removed by the prosecutor than a non-African-American.” Joseph
L. Gastwirth, Statistical Testing of Peremptory Challenge Data for Possible Discrimination: Application to Foster
v. Chatman, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 66 (2016).
108. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.
109. See id. at 339 (providing the trial court must investigate the credibility of race-neutral
explanations by evaluating “among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or
how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in
accepted trial strategy”).
110. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
111. See id. at 237–38 (asserting racial prejudice in the courtroom harms prospective jurors,
defendants, the court itself, and “public confidence in adjudication.”).
112. Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 350.
113. Id. at 350–54.
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race in the prosecutors’ choice of questioning cannot be explained
away.”114
The acceptance of discrimination as something which can be implied,
even within a race-neutral explanation, acknowledges the very problem that
race-neutral explanations pose.115 Though this problem was referenced in
Batson,116 Miller-El II was the first time the Court acknowledged both a need
and a path to discover such implicit racial biases as part of any peremptory
strike evaluation.117 In short, Miller-El II provided that “all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be
consulted.”118 This evaluation, coupled with the five factors described,
applies to the Batson third step but also “presumptively apply to step one’s
lighter burden for proving an inference of discrimination.”119
The Court expanded on this reasoning in Snyder v. Louisiana,120 which
held “the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor’s
demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s
demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the
strike. . . . ”121 In Snyder, the trial judge did not independently review a
prosecutor’s demeanor-based strike, allowing a peremptory strike based on
a Black prospective juror’s “nervousness.”122 Additionally, a secondary
reason for the strike—the same prospective juror’s student-teacher schedule
appearing problematic—was not evaluated by the judge at all, despite a
white juror with a more problematic schedule not being struck.123 Further,
the Snyder Court held that while a trial court should be given deference in its
114. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 263.
115. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 175 (“[T]he characteristic might be such a close proxy for
race that, in the language of the Batson opinion, it would not supply a ‘neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors.’”).
116. Despite Batson’s recognition of the inherent problem in identifying race-neutrality, the
Court expressly declined to provide any instructive procedures. See Pizzi, supra note 54, at 112 (“The
Court left to the lower courts the task of working out the procedures to be followed if the prosecutor
does not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case—whether, for example, to start the jury selection
process over with a new panel or to require the reinstatement of improperly challenged jurors.”).
117. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 (“If any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson
challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain. Some stated reasons are false, and
although some false reasons are shown up within the four corners of a given case, sometimes a court
may not be sure unless it looks beyond the case at hand.”).
118. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (emphasis added).
119. Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 354.
120. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
121. Id. at 477.
122. Id. at 479.
123. Id. at 483–84.
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determination, an appellate court should not give deference without findings
of fact as to credibility in the record.124
The next Batson decision prior to Flowers was Foster v. Chatman,125
significant because it exemplified precisely how Batson failed to end
discrimination.126 Foster presented a particular ironic quagmire specifically
because the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations survived challenge at the
trial and appellate court level. It was only after the discovery of documents
“reveal[ing] the disjuncture between the proffered reasons and the
motivating reasons” on the part of the State that the Court found
discriminatory intent and reversed the judgment.127 This fundamental
disparity between the reason given and the actual reason for the strikes
highlighted that but for a prosecutor making a “rookie mistake” and
admitting discriminatory intent in his or her explanation, a proverbial
“smoking gun” is necessary at the trial court level to result in a successful
Batson challenge.128 This is despite the power of statistical evidence of
discriminatory challenges.129 It has been argued the Court’s “fact-bound
opinion” in Foster missed a crucial opportunity to correct Batson so that
disparities such as those highlighted above are not possible, or merely not
worth the effort due to the increased likelihood of discriminatory intent
findings.130
124. Watts & Jeffcott, supra note 50, at 354–57.
125. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
126. See Marder, A Missed Opportunity for Batson, supra note 22, at 1137 (“Batson is easy to evade,
so discriminatory peremptory challenges persist and the harms from them are significant.”); see also
Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 511 (1994) (“[D]emonstrating the inability of the judicial process to discover
racially motivated peremptory challenges.”).
127. Marder, Reflections Inspired by a Podcast, supra note 14, at 1141. The documents included
copies of the jury list where prospective Black jurors were specifically highlighted, a draft affidavit
containing a provision for if they “had to pick a black juror,” notes by the prosecutors showing all
Black jurors struck, additional documents which listed the potential Black jurors as “definite NO’s,”
and a note that said: “No Black Church.” Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744 (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 1141–42; see Aliza Plener Cover, Hybrid Jury Strikes, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357,
357 (2017) (“A framework that depends on such transparency is weak and ineffective.”).
129. Joseph B. Kadane, Statistics for Batson Challenges, L. PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 5 (2018)
(presenting statistical evidence showing all four Black prospective jurors were challenged in Foster, while
only five of thirty-two white prospective jurors were challenged). The “number of African-Americans
removed by the prosecutor is statistically significantly higher than expected under random selection.
Indeed, disparities of [this] magnitude . . . provides strong support for the defendant’s claim.”
Gastwirth, supra note 107, at 55.
130. See Marder, Reflections Inspired by a Podcast, supra note 14, at 1141–42 (“If the Court tweaks
the Batson test, it can try to give the defendant a variety of ways of establishing discriminatory intent,
which is a difficult showing for a defendant to make. It could do this by permitting the defendant to
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Batson’s history is one of frustration—a legacy of constant revision, with
each methodology continuing to fall short of its goal in eradicating racial
discrimination in the courtroom.131 The line of cases began by merely
asking to whom Batson applied,132 before evaluating the procedure in
establishing a prima facie case and the role of the prosecutor’s
explanation.133 Finally, the third prong’s development, whether there is
intentional discrimination, represents the Court’s inability or unwillingness
to address Batson’s inadequacies.134 There is a sense of exasperation in each
of the Court’s opinions at the inability to put race-based challenges behind
it.135 The Court acknowledged post-Strauder that “critical problems
persisted,” and yet it was unable to recognize the same for the post-Batson
reality in its Flowers opinion.136 Without reflection of the “critical
problems” which could allow for such a breach of law, Batson and its
progeny remain fundamentally well-intentioned but toothless.

infer discriminatory intent from a ‘discriminatory effect’ or a ‘discriminatory practice.’”); see also Cover,
supra note 128, at 359 (“[I]nstead, it largely functions as a reminder not to leave behind written evidence
of such misconduct.”).
131. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“Racial discrimination in selection of jurors
harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.”); see also Batson, 476 U.S.
at 102–03 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of any
burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of peremptories . . . [t]he decision today will not end
the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.”); Marder, Reflections
Inspired by a Podcast, supra note 14, at 625 (“Fifty years of experimentation should be sufficient to
establish that these tests do not work—they have not eliminated discriminatory peremptory
challenges.”).
132. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (discussing whether Batson
encompasses gender); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 352 (1991) (determining whether
discrimination against Latinos was also prohibited).
133. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 164 (2005) (addressing whether the “more likely
than not” standard of review is appropriate for determining possible group bias); Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (finding the prosecutor’s explanation need not be “persuasive, or even
plausible.”).
134. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2251 (2019); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737,
1747 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485–86 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241
(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–40 (2003).
135. See Page, supra note 14, at 161 (“This is the heart of the Batson problem, rather than the
deliberately dishonest racist and sexist lawyer.”).
136. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2239. The opinion of Flowers is, in some sense, eerily similar in
wording to Batson itself. The Batson Court was “called upon . . . to review the application of those
principles to particular facts.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 90. Flowers answers the same call: “We simply
enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct.
at 2251.
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III. FLOWERS AND THE FAILURE OF BATSON
A. History of Flowers
If you try a man and you go six times for the same crime well, something is
wrong about the Constitution or something is wrong about the law or
something is wrong about the prosecution or something is wrong about the
defense or something is wrong about the entire system.137

In July 1996, a quadruple homicide shook the small town of Winona,
Mississippi. Four employees, three white and one Black, of Tardy Furniture,
were found shot in the head inside the store—three were declared dead at
the scene, and the fourth died later in the local hospital.138 Although the
murder was committed downtown and on a sunny morning, Winona police
had little evidence.139 The community wanted results fast, as “[t]here was
no apparent motive, and the randomness of the crime made it terrifying.”140
What resulted was a perfect storm of prosecutorial misconduct and one
defendant’s dogged protests of innocence in a racially divided
community:141 Flowers would ultimately experience “[s]ix trials over
twenty-one years” for the same crime.142
Doug Evans, who is white, prosecuted all six trials.143 All but the first
two trials were for all four murders.144 The history of jury selection within
these six trials is critical; as the Supreme Court later put it: “The numbers
speak loudly.”145 Over the course of five trials,146 Evans struck forty-one
137. July 16, 1996, In the Dark, APM REPORTS, at 2:14, (May 1, 2018) (downloaded using iTunes)
(emphasis added).
138. Parker Yesko, The Tardy Furniture Store Murders: What Happened That Morning in July ’96?,
APM REPORTS (May 1, 2018), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2018/05/01/tardy-furnituremurders-what-happened [https://perma.cc/N4VW-W9BX].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236 (“The town is about 53 percent black and about 46 percent
white.”); see also July 16, 1996, supra note 137, at 2:48 (“[A]nd it’s clear that the way people think about
the Curtis Flowers case, for the most part, depends on whether they’re white or black.”).
142. July 16, 1996, supra note 137, at 1:21.
143. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
144. In the first two trials, Flowers was charged for solely one murder. Id. at 2236.
145. Id. at 2245.
146. A breakdown of the first four trials and respective strikes by racial breakdown is provided
in the Appendix—data of prospective jurors for the fifth trial is not available. See Appendix infra. The
seated “jury was composed of nine white jurors and three black jurors.” Id. at 2237.
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out of forty-eight Black prospective jurors.147 Despite numerous
objections by defense counsel, the trial judge identified only one of these
strikes as racially motivated.148 This is despite Evans not once, but twice,
using all of his available peremptory strikes solely to strike Black jurors, and
on two other occasions striking all of the prospective Black jurors due to
their small numbers.149 Flowers appealed each conviction, and the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction except the sixth,
finding by the third trial that “[t]he instant case presents us with as strong a
prima facie case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context
of a Batson challenge.”150
Flowers reaffirms Batson’s two critical components: (1) a prosecutor’s
peremptory strike history may be used as evidence by the defendant in
establishing a prima facie case of racial bias, and (2) the front line guarding
against racially discriminatory strikes remains the trial judge.151 The latter
is of particular import given any appellate review of a Batson review is highly
deferential to the trial court.152
Curtis Flowers’s attorneys offered four categories of evidence to prove
discrimination:
(1) the history from Flowers’ six trials, (2) the prosecutor’s striking of five of
six black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, (3) the prosecutor’s dramatically
disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial,
and (4) the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking one black juror
(Carolyn Wright) while allowing other similarly situated white jurors to serve
on the jury at the sixth trial.153

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, held that the totality of this
evidence warranted a reversal due to the trial court’s clear error.154 In so
147. Id. at 2236–37.
148. In the second trial, the trial judge found that the race-neutral reason the prosecution
offered was fabricated, and the “Batson challenge” by Flowers was sustained. Id. at 2236.
149. In the third trial, Evans used all fifteen available peremptory strikes to strike fifteen
prospective Black jurors. Id. at 2236. One Black juror was seated only “after the State ran out of
peremptory strikes.” Id. at 2237. This pattern repeated in the fourth trial, where all eleven available
peremptory strikes were used against Black jurors. Id.
150. Id. at 2237.
151. See id. at 2243 (“[D]efendants may present: statistical evidence about the prosecutor’s use
of peremptory strikes . . . . [T]he job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges.”).
152. Id. at 2244.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2251.
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doing, Justice Kavanaugh asserted: “[W]e break no new legal ground. We
simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts
of this case.”155
The Court’s repeated assertions that Flowers is an extraordinary case
undercuts its reinforcement of Batson.156 Indeed, the facts in Flowers are not
extraordinary, particularly in the deep south or any smaller jurisdiction
divided along racial lines.157 History proves Flowers is not unique—
disparate questioning and weighty statistical evidence of discriminatory
strikes against Black jurors were also present in Miller-El, decided by the
Court almost fifteen years prior.158
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito highlighted the fault line of
Batson—racially discriminatory methods during jury selection may result in
“racially neutral” explanations accepted by the trial court. He wrote that
“another prosecutor in another case in a larger jurisdiction” could give the
same rationalizations as the State in Flowers, and this would be sufficient,
ignoring the methods by which the prosecution took to get the information
in the first place and that this information did not produce same or even
similar results across Black and white prospective jurors.159 Prosecutorial
explanations for peremptory strikes may thus appear, at the outset, to be
convincingly race-neutral; however, those explanations may be thinly-veiled
proxies for race, the result of racially discriminatory methods, or both.160

155. Id.
156. Id. at 2235, 2251; see also id. at 2251 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As the Court takes pains to
note, this is a highly unusual case.”).
157. See Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1623 (“[R]ace-based exclusion from jury
service . . . has been central to criminal adjudication throughout American history. It remains so
now.”).
158. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235–36 (2005) (asserting there was sufficient
evidence to support defense counsel’s Batson challenge due to prosecutor’s extensive jury panel
shuffling, incomparable strikes between white and Black jurors, and exclusion of 91% of eligible Black
jurors).
159. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2251–52 (Alito, J., concurring). Beyond the blatant historical
statistical evidence of racial discrimination, “the State engaged in dramatically disparate questioning of
black and white prospective jurors. And it engaged in disparate treatment of black and white
prospective jurors . . . .” Id. at 2251.
160. See Thompson, supra note 30, at 117 (explaining reasoning is not often race-neutral due to
various socio-economic factors and “involve[ment] in the criminal justice system . . . and living or
working in a high crime area,” which are racially coded).
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The acceptance of these strikes results in effectively voiding—or, more
cynically put, validating—the original discriminatory conduct.161
The problem with Batson, then, is it ignores the larger, systemic effect of
racism and implicit biases entirely, focusing on curing or eliminating racism
which expresses itself loudly either in the instant or cumulative effect.162
This does not consider how racism has changed over the three decades since
Batson was decided.163
The courts’ approach to Batson challenges misses the small kernel of truth
that underlies race-based strikes: representation does, in fact, matter.164
And it should. As peers to the defendant, prospective minority jurors’ racial
identity gives them relevant experience by which they can judge a witness,
view the evidence, assess culpability, and more.165 Research has shown that
diverse juries are vitally important in order to combat unconscious
biases.166 “[A]ll-white jur[ies are] more likely to convict a black defendant”
161. See Hoffman, supra note 37, at 139 (“Peremptory challenges mean that we have concluded
it’s just too hard to answer all those icky questions about bias, so let’s just let the lawyers exclude a few
jurors without having to convince us those jurors are actually biased.”).
162. For example, the written policy manual “Jury Selection in a Criminal Case,” which
mandated “a formal policy to exclude minorities from jury service,” was the root of the Miller-El cases.
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 264 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334 (2003)). Though written in
1968, these policies remained available to the District Attorney’s Office through the Miller-El trial in
1989. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 264–65.
163. Racism has shifted over the decades, from overt displays to subtlety, and is arguably now
even more pervasive:
The nature of this bias has evolved somewhat over the decades. For some, it has shifted from
being conscious and on the surface to a phenomenon that is more subtle, yet still pervasive.
Psychologists believe racism among whites still exists in modern America, but the manifestation
of bias has changed. Overt racism is frowned upon in most white social circles, leaving the
expression of racial ideations to occur in more subtle or “acceptable” manners. One such
“acceptable” manner is to oppose social policies . . . which are designed to lead to equality.
Francis, supra note 5, at 333. This perspective of racism as a thing of the past also ignores how subtle
racism “can be as insidious as the older traditional form of discrimination.” Page, supra note 14, at 185.
164. See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U.L. REV. 777, 798 (1994) (“To the extent that persons
of color can contribute points of view that may not be readily apparent to majority jurors, the
deliberative process may be substantially fairer and wiser.”).
165. See Leslie Ellis & Shari S. Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering
Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2003) (arguing lack of diversity on jury panels creates a
myopic perspective without “differing life experiences and potentially differing expectations and
predispositions that can influence the assessments of the evidence, including judgments about witness
credibility, that characterize the impartial jury . . . .”).
166. Without diverse juries, similar jurors are grouped together. Page, supra note 14, at 195–96.
This can result in group bias, whereby individuals within that same group are judged less harshly than
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for the same crime as a white defendant and are also more likely to convict
a Black defendant entirely.167 Given “demographic realities,” smaller
numbers of African-American persons will be presented as prospective
jurors, leading even a single peremptory strike to be a potential total
elimination of any jury diversity.168 Thus: “The desire to achieve a colorblind system actually thwarts efforts to obtain a racially balanced jury for the
people who historically have had the most difficulty obtaining equal
protection under the law.”169 This same sensibility is present in
Justice Thomas’s Flowers dissent.
B. The Batson Paradox: Thomas’s Dissent in Flowers
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Flowers has become somewhat infamous, in
large part because his opinion is “genuinely outraged—not by the
prosecutor but by his fellow-Justices . . . .”170 Justice Thomas, faced with what
some would identify as a mountain of evidence of discriminatory intent,
argued that the majority decision (authored by a fellow conservative,
Justice Kavanaugh) “distorts the record of this case, eviscerates our standard
of review, and vacates four murder convictions because the State struck a
juror who would have been stricken by any competent attorney.”171 In
short, Justice Thomas’s opinion of the case itself boils down to the simple
defense that the State had provided “strong race-neutral reason[s]” for every
strike, including those specifically at issue on certiorari.172

those outside it. Id. Not only will “same-group” people view those outside more negatively, they “even
selectively process information that will reinforce these views over information that does not.” Id.
167. Francis, supra note 5, at 298.
168. See id. at 299 (“[D]emographic realities place minority defendants at a greater disadvantage
than other litigants.”).
169. Id. at 298.
170. Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas’s Astonishing Opinion on a Racist Mississippi Prosecutor, NEW
YORKER (June 21, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/clarence-thomassastonishing-opinion-on-a-racist-mississippi-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/3ZYR-DLT7] (emphasis
added). See also Thomas W. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, 72 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 4 (2019) (“Justice Thomas alleges the seven Justices in the majority were not engaged in a
good-faith effort . . . [but] to ‘boost its self-esteem.’”).
171. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2253 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2255–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This is despite the overwhelming evidence which
shows that even “the more overt variety of racially motivated exclusions . . . remain common.”
Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1627.
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As others have noted, Justice Thomas’s systematic and, some would
argue, willfully blind defense of the State, is misguided.173 Justice Thomas’s
claims of strikes being race-neutral is incorrect—in the third Flowers case
(Flowers III) before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the conclusion that there
were multiple Batson violations was unanimous.174 The decision was a
plurality only because one justice did not believe the violation should result
in a new trial, not because she disagreed that a violation occurred.175
Additionally, Justice Thomas’s argument that defense counsel similarly
utilized discriminatory strikes—striking eleven white jurors and no Black
jurors—is disingenuous. Mississippi grants the right of peremptory strikes
to defendants only after the State has accepted a juror.176 In Flowers III,
because the State struck nearly all Black prospective jurors, the defense was
left with only one Black juror to potentially strike in the first place.177 How
Thomas’s statistical analysis is framed ignores the crucial underlying fact
which “reveals much about the success of prosecutors’ efforts to eliminate
Black potential jurors and little about Flowers’s alleged anti-white biases.”178
Though flawed in its extremes, Justice Thomas’s dissent contains a core
argument—that Batson has failed—which is valid.179 As Justice Thomas
argues, and many legal scholars would surely agree, Batson “ignores . . . the
realities of racial prejudice.”180 The reality to which Thomas refers is the
widespread nature of racism—not just that it still exists, but that it remains
Though
deeply ingrained in our nation’s culture and fabric.181
Justice Thomas’s argument runs further, citing the nature of the peremptory
strike “reflect[ing] no judgment . . . . [I]nstead, [being] exercised based on
intuitions that a potential juror may be less sympathetic to a party’s case,”
173. See Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 4 (“Such jabs
might land softer if Justice Thomas weren’t so sloppy (or mendacious) with the statistical evidence in
the case.”).
174. Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007).
175. See id. at 939 (Cobb, J., concurring) (“I concur with this Court’s judgment . . . I write
separately because I do not agree that this case is reversible on the Batson issue alone.”).
176. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 4.
177. Id. at 4–5.
178. Id. at 5.
179. See id. at 1–2 (contending “Justice Thomas’s dissent . . . gets right many things about the
Batson doctrine and race in the courtroom that the Court’s liberal wing has proven loath to confront.”).
180. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2272 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 6; see also
Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1620 (“[A]cross American jury boxes today there are
thousands of missing nonwhite jurors. Instead, these seats are filled by white jurors that, absent
systemic racial exclusion, a nonwhite juror would be occupying.”).
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his initial contention is essentially an argument of the reality and dangers of
implicit bias.182 The roots of Justice Thomas’s argument sprout from his
fundamental “race pessimism, a belief in the perdurability and protean
quality of racism.”183 Moreover, Justice Thomas’s belief is strident that
racism is a national problem.184 By this, Justice Thomas means that racism
is a past, present, and future reality, unconstrained by geography, which
cannot be ignored—it is an inescapable fact that is embedded into every
fabric of life, and even integration will not cure it.185
This notion that racism permeates everything and everyone reflects “the
paradox of Batson.”186 This paradox is defined by the Court’s absolute
rejection that race has any effect on a juror’s perspective and decisionmaking capabilities in a courtroom and violations “have nothing to do with
the reliability of verdicts” as a result; yet, there are justices who believe race
is, in fact, “at least a minimally rational predictor . . . and who see no error
of any kind in a Batson situation.”187 This draws a bold line down the middle
of the Court, and is reflected in the Batson line of cases which refine its
principles over and over again, exemplifying “the full paradox of Batson: the

182. Flowers, 139 S. Ct at 2272.
183. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 6.
184. See id. at 7 (“The Court’s sole southerner, Justice Thomas also seems to resent the
implication that American racism is the exclusive provenance of backwoods southern whites.”).
Justice Thomas’s seeming anger and disbelief at the majority opinion is an expression of this deepseated anger, and perhaps resentment, at those on the Court “who believe that racism is either defeated
or being diminished.” Corey Robin, Clarence Thomas’s Radical Vision of Race, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/essay/clarence-thomass-radical-vision-of-race [https://
perma.cc/JV3S-XG5C].
(Feb. 1987),
185. See
Juan
Williams,
A
Question
of
Fairness,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/race/thomas.htm [https://perma.cc/BKL9-JLPL]
(interviewing Justice Thomas, quoted as saying “There is nothing you can do to get past black skin . . .
I don’t care how educated you are, how good you are at what you do—you’ll never have the same
contacts or opportunities, you’ll never be seen as equal to whites.”); see also Frampton, What
Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 6 (“Perhaps more than anyone in the Court’s
history, Justice Thomas ‘believes that racism is so profoundly inscribed in the white soul that you’ll
never be able to remove it.’”).
186. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96 (1996); see also Morrison, supra note 23, at 21 (“What we have now is
the worst of both worlds: persistent concerns about racial discrimination paired with a peremptory
challenge that does not function properly.”).
187. Muller, supra note 186, at 96; see also Alschuler, supra note 11, at 154–55 (“[W]e have
captured the worst of two worlds, creating burdensome, unnecessary and ineffective jury controls at
the front end of the criminal trial while failing to implement badly needed controls at the back end.”).
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Justices who would find harm in a Batson violation cannot; the Justices who
can find harm in a Batson violation will not.”188
Justice Thomas’s theory of Batson as a fundamental failure is supported
not only by a surfeit of academic scholarship but also by statistical
evidence.189 In the thirty years since the Supreme Court decided Batson,
North Carolina’s Supreme Court has not found even one substantive
violation, despite its review of seventy-four cases comprising of eighty-one
Batson challenges.190 In fact, “in all the 114 North Carolina appellate Batson
cases involving minority jurors decided on the merits since 1986, the courts
have never found a substantive Batson violation where a prosecutor has
managed to articulate even one reason, however fantastic, for the
peremptory challenge.”191 Yet, the Court of Appeals did adjudicate two
“successful ‘reverse Batson’ claims where the court found purposeful
discrimination against white jurors challenged by black defendants.”192 Thus,
Justice Thomas’s worst nightmare—Batson as a use against a Black
defendant—is an actual reality.193
This demonstrated that a lack of fair representation is critical when
considered in relation to death penalty trials.194 The likelihood of all-white
188. Muller, supra note 186, at 96.
189. See Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1621–22 (presenting data collected by
investigative journalists into a study based in Louisiana, the largest ever on the use of peremptory
strikes, which shows “[p]rosecutors wield both peremptory strikes and for-cause challenges to eliminate
black potential jurors at an extraordinarily disproportionate rate, and they do so with greater frequency
when prosecuting black defendants.”).
190. Pollitt & Warren, supra note 20, at 1961. Further, the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
deciding forty-three Batson claims, “has found a substantive . . . violation . . . in only one case.” Pollitt
& Warren, supra note 20, at 1962.
191. Id. at 1963 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 1962 (emphasis added).
193. See id. at 1963–64 (presenting a twenty-year study by Michigan State University College of
Law, finding in 173 capital cases, “prosecutors struck black jurors at 2.48 times the rate they struck all
other jurors.”). During Doug Evans’s tenure as District Attorney, 418 trials have taken place. Of those
418, 225 trials have race and peremptory strike information recorded. In those 225 trials, “prosecutors
struck black prospective jurors at almost 4½ times the rate they struck white prospective jurors . . . .
In every instance, a racial disparity in strikes persisted.” Will Craft, Mississippi D.A. Has Long History of
Striking Many Blacks from Juries, APM REPORTS (June 12, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-thedark/mississippi-district-attorney-striking-blacks-from-juries/ [https://perma.cc/QL7R-25TV].
194. See generally Noelle Nasif et al., Racial Exclusion and Death Penalty Juries: Can Death Penalty
Juries Ever Be Representative?, 27 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 147, 148 (2018) (“Convening a jury that is nonrepresentative of the country’s population has growing implications for death penalty trials.”); see also
Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a
Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (“Capital jury selection practices . . . have taken on
added importance in recent years . . . in view of the high potential for arbitrary and discriminatory
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juries is particularly critical given “death penalty supporters are far more
likely to be white, male, and conservative.”195 Prosecutors will undoubtedly
take this into account in utilizing their challenge, particularly postUttecht v. Brown,196 which “gave prosecutors the right to challenge the
seating of jurors who express any doubt about the death penalty,” a process
whereby jurors are certified as death qualified.197 What results is an increased
likelihood (perhaps even a near certainty) that death penalty juries will be
largely, if not entirely, white, male, and conservative, due to “[t]he increased
ability to exclude minority jurors . . . creat[ing] inherently unconstitutional
juries . . . .”198 “These [same] jurors [also] tend to be more prone to
convict.”199 Consequentially, “the chance that a person is convicted and
sentenced to death because of race . . . rises dramatically.”200
In light of a “record so remarkable and disappointing,” it is no surprise,
then, that Justice Thomas’s dissent in Flowers argues Batson should be
abolished, but peremptory strikes should remain.201 Justice Thomas’s
argument stems from the perspective that Batson, and the cases that
expanded Batson’s reach, are an attempt to regulate peremptory challenges,
which should remain discretionary to preserve their true function: “I would
return to our pre-Batson understanding—that race matters in the courtroom—
and thereby return litigants one of the most important tools to combat
prejudice in their cases.”202 Thus, the peremptory challenge must remain
for the sake of the Black defendant.203 As such, in Justice Thomas’s view,
the defendant’s ability to pick, or simply not strike, prospective jurors of

application of the penalty” when “leaving the life or death decision to the unfettered discretion of the
jury.”).
195. Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 148.
196. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
197. Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 148–49 (2018); see also Winick, supra note 194, at 5 (1982)
(asserting “[t]he systematic exclusion of jurors generally opposed to the death penalty by prosecutorial
use of the peremptory challenge may violate a defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury”).
198. Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 149; see also Winick, supra note 194, at 72 (“In view of the size
and distinctive character of the segment of the community opposed to capital punishment, systematic
exclusion . . . would seem to raise a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment cross-section
requirement.”).
199. Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 153.
200. Id. at 149.
201. Pollitt & Warren, supra note 20, at 1964; see Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2271
(2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining “[t]he more fundamental problem is Batson itself”).
202. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
203. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing peremptory challenges allow the defendant to
secure same-representation on the jury, thereby giving a greater chance for a fair trial).
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their own race is a pathway to overcoming racial bias precisely because they
can, in turn, strike hostile white jurors.204 Justice Thomas’s vision of the
peremptory strike as an almost revolutionary tool for a minority defendant
to effectively “balance the scales” is laudable. However, it ignores the
mathematical truth of “demographic realities” which, even when strikes are
utilized equally by the defense and State, can still, and indeed “[are] far more
likely,” to ensure all-white juries.205
Batson and Flowers are separated by more than thirty years, and yet nothing
has changed.206 Batson’s jurisprudence is an optimistically stark moment for
the Court—a hope that, with its decision, racial discrimination in the
courtroom will cease to exist.207 Flowers represents a much different mark
for the Court—Batson simply has not worked, and “despite the optimistic
tone of Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion, it is an open secret that Batson
ensnares only the ‘unapologetically bigoted or painfully unimaginative
attorney.’”208 This is the core of Justice Thomas’s disgust with the Flowers
opinion—“‘[r]ace matters . . .’ in a host of ways that the Batson doctrine is
ill-equipped to confront,” and the Court, exemplified by
Justice Kavanaugh’s optimistic opinion, refuses to acknowledge it.209 The
question then becomes—what can be done to resolve this paradox? The

204. See id. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting the ability to choose for both the defense
and the State “eliminate[s] extremes of partiality on both sides[,]” allowing for greater fairness and
impartiality).
205. For example:
[A] pool of 36 qualified jurors, 67% of whom (24) are white and 33% of whom (12) are nonwhite.
If both the defendant and prosecutors have 12 peremptory strikes, and may wield them in a
racially discriminatory manner, the State can ensure an all-white jury in every case.
Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 5 n.25; see also Francis, supra
note 5, at 299 (“[D]emographic realities place minority defendants at a greater disadvantage than other
litigants . . . .”).
206. See Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1593 (“The Jim Crow jury never fell.
Over a century later, state-sanctioned racial discrimination in jury selection remains ubiquitous, and the
racial composition of juries continues to shape substantive trial outcomes.”).
207. See Appleman, supra note 19, at 608 (arguing the Batson framework procedure positively
affects both lawyers and the public by compelling “a normative framework of legal ethics . . . [which]
foster[s] . . . nondiscrimination” within jury selection and encourages the moral aspirations of the bar).
208. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 8.
209. Id. at 9–10; see also Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1811 (1993) (arguing the Supreme Court has “been
unwilling to confront the pervasive effects of racism in any meaningful way.”); Muller, supra note 186,
at 98 (“For many years, the Supreme Court has struggled with the similar question of whether it is
rational for an attorney to draw inferences about viewpoint from a prospective juror’s race . . . .”).
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answer ultimately boils down to whether the peremptory strike should be
abolished entirely or retained with certain restrictions.210 The ultimate
unifying ideal is precisely what Justice Thomas has expressed—“race always
matters in the courtroom,” with the disagreement arising as to precisely how
to navigate such murky waters.211
C. Peremptory Challenge in the Wake of Flowers
Before any argument can be made to abolish or fundamentally change the
peremptory challenge system, it is crucial to evaluate the arguments that
support its continuation. Two reasons have been identified for the
peremptory challenge system’s use: (1) a litigant could simply dislike, with
reason or not, a certain juror; and (2) a defendant could have reason to think
a prospective juror may begrudge him or her, and exercise a challenge
effectively in defense.212 Thus, “[t]he most convincing justifications for the
challenge rest on notions of party autonomy and participation—the theory
that, by giving the litigants the chance to select their own juries, they are
more likely to see the result reached by that jury as far.”213 This effectively
breaks down into three factors, which are the primary benefits of the
peremptory challenge system: (1) impartiality, (2) compensating for the
challenge for cause, and (3) autonomy and participation.214
These justifications simply do not withstand scrutiny. There exists an
enormity of evidence to suggest counsel does not utilize challenges in search
of a truly “‘impartial’ jury, but rather[,] to eliminate those who are
sympathetic to the other side,” precisely the opposite of impartiality.215 It is
210. See Morrison, supra note 23, at 22 (“Proposals to improve the current regime fall into two
camps: either a complete overhaul of jury selection procedures or a strengthening of the Batson
framework.”).
211. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 11.
212. Morrison, supra note 23, at 11.
213. Id. at 11–12.
214. Id. at 12–15. Other benefits include increased confidence in the jury selection system as a
whole while also promoting confidence for the lawyers themselves by allowing them some measure of
control over the process. This undoubtedly explains why “the vast majority of practicing trial lawyers
in the United States want to continue using peremptory challenges in voir dire.” Griebat, supra
note 6, at 329.
215. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Fire: Preserving Its Wonderful Power, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 551
(1975); see Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1595–96 (“Recent scholarship illustrates how
the legacies of Jim Crow infect and permeate contemporary criminal justice—from surveillance and
policing to mass incarceration and execution . . . [b]ut the enduring role of racial exclusion in jury
selection—and the stark, outcome-determinative impact of this exclusion—remains
undercontextualized and inadequately documented.”).
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true peremptory strikes can function as a safety net from unsuccessful
challenges for cause, but in actual practice may suffer from being “used too
parsimoniously.”216 Finally, the argument that the peremptory strike
provides autonomy and participation has an essential root in the challenge’s
history—the strike was for hundreds of years a right accorded solely to the
defendant.217 As the population has changed and as rights have been
afforded to minority populations, the grant to the prosecutor of the right to
strike limited that autonomy and participation as jury selection became a
question not of a jury panel’s capability to provide a reliable verdict, but a
game to win by selecting the best players for each side.218
D. Alternatives to the Peremptory Challenge System
In response to the Batson paradox and what it represents for the
peremptory challenge system as a whole, scholarship has increasingly
focused on alternatives. These divide into two groups: those wishing to
abolish the system entirely and those wishing to restrict/modify the existing
system to “improve” the Batson doctrine.219 Abolishing the system entirely
is perhaps most often cited, with many arguing it is not a constitutional right
and should, therefore, not be guaranteed to continue.220 However, with

216. Morrison, supra note 23, at 15. Moreso, “it hardly seems unreasonable to consider ways in
which to improve the challenge for cause, rather than leaving it in an unsatisfactory state and relying
on the peremptory challenge to mop up after it.” Id.
217. Francis, supra note 5, at 301.
218. See Akhil R. Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1174
(1995) (arguing lawyers have increasingly “aggrandiz[ed] their own roles in litigation at the expense of
the jury” due to personal motives, leading to them “wrest[ing] control from the whole people, embodied
in the jury idea”); see also Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily
Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 419 (2010) (“A defendant is guaranteed an
impartial jury; a prosecutor attempts to thwart this constitutional guarantee when trying to seat a jury
biased in her favor. . . . [T]he prosecutor should ‘take the high road’ and waive peremptories.”). But
see Appleman, supra note 19, at 608 (“By fostering a nondiscrimination norm as a part of the norm of
professionalization, Batson improves the actions of both lawyers and judges during jury selection while
at the same time constructing and compelling an aspirational code of ethics.”).
219. Morrison, supra note 23, at 22 (“Proposals to improve the current regime fall into two
camps: either a complete overhaul of jury selection procedures or a strengthening of the Batson
framework.”).
220. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 209 (“Few peremptory challenges could survive even
rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. These challenges are not worth saving.”); see
also Marder, Reflections Inspired by a Podcast, supra note 14, at 625 (“Not only should Batson be abandoned,
but peremptories should be eliminated.”); Melilli, supra note 15, at 503 (“It is time for the peremptory
challenge to go. It will not be missed.”); Morrison, supra note 23, at 24 (“The only truly effective curb
on racially motivated peremptory challenges is to eliminate them entirely.”).
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support from counsel and judges on both sides of the aisle, it seems unlikely
such turnover will occur.221
Other scholars disagree with the notion that the peremptory challenge
system should be eliminated entirely.
Perhaps most famous is
222
that Batson should not be eliminated,
Justice Thomas’s argument
retaining the peremptory system as a way to provide, in particular, Black
defendants the right to fight pervasive racism from which there is no
escape—a perfect tool to balance the scales, one needing no
modification.223 Justice Thomas’s argument is the minority one—many
scholars propose retaining the peremptory system with various
modifications to ensure non-discriminatory practices as much as is possible.
A simple proposal to refine Batson is to shift from a focus on pretext to one
specifically geared to identifying intentional discrimination.224 Though the
hardships in either “may be equivalent . . .[,] it is extremely difficult for
defendants to show any given reason is pretextual . . . .”225 Additional
examples of these other alternatives include the blind peremptory
challenge,226 congressional and/or legislative requirements for
representative juries,227 expansion of challenges for cause,228 allowing for

221. See Morrison, supra note 23, at 25-26 (“[L]awyers are not likely to part with their challenges
anytime soon.”). But see Hoffman, supra note 37, at 135–36 (“[T]rial lawyers love peremptory challenges
and trial judges don’t. . . . When the robes go on, the bloom falls off the peremptory challenge rose.”).
222. See discussion supra Part II, Section B.
223. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2271 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting
the ability to choose for both the defense and the State provides a balance to both extremes, allowing
for greater fairness and impartiality).
224. Polster, supra note 14, at 547–48.
225. Id. at 548.
226. The blind peremptory system suggests keeping the peremptory challenge the same except
for identifying prospective jurors by number only. Jurors would be questioned by a written
questionnaire only, with no ability to ask questions relating to “cognizable group status.” Scholars
argue the blind peremptory system “frees the litigant to exercise more principled peremptory
challenges.” Montoya, supra note 11, at 981; see also Griebat, supra note 6, at 324–25 (arguing the blind
questionnaire process eliminates discrimination and provides more impartial juries).
227. Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 166.
228. See Morrison, supra note 23, at 15 (“[P]rocedures that excuse jurors neutrally (by the clerk
of court, say).”). An example of an expansion to the challenge for cause in place of peremptory strikes
would be the “inferable bias” challenge, granting the trial judge discretionary right to excuse a juror.
This would require additional training for “judges[,] [who] must be sensitized to the signposts of
discrimination.” Cavise, supra note 34, at 550.
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judges to play a more active role in the peremptory process,229 and
additional training for lawyers.230
Perhaps the most intriguing of these alternatives to the peremptory
challenge system is the hybrid strike.231 These are peremptory strikes that
can “only be exercised after the ex ante articulation of a race-neutral and
meaningful argument for exclusion.”232 This would require counsel to
provide “meaningful reasons” without the Batson first step requirement.233
Effectively, counsel would still be allowed to make a peremptory strike but
must presumptively explain why the prospective juror is not fit to serve.234
This “would enforce rationality and equal protection where it was previously
lacking [by] . . . provid[ing] cover for impermissible racism and sexism.”235
Whatever the method, it is clear the peremptory challenge problem, even
when not used intentionally to discriminate, must be significantly reworked
to combat those who argue the “existing Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence may be even more infirm than cynics allege.”236
IV. CONCLUSION
It is easy to blame this travesty on a single prosecutor from Mississippi. That
would be a mistake. The brand of racism at work in this case is systemic.
People believed Flowers was guilty for the same reason they believe in
conspiracy theories like QAnon. Those who fear their cherished way of life
is in jeopardy are predisposed to trust authority figures who embody their
fear. . . . [I]n a brief statement released the day of [Flowers’s] liberation, he

229. Cavise, supra note 34, at 549–50.
230. See Morrison, supra note 23, at 15 (“Bar associations could improve lawyer training so that
they can conduct effective voir dire without offending prospective jurors.”). As an example—in Texas,
scholars have argued for a very specific individual peremptory challenge: “to provide a mechanism for
merit-based jury selection,” essentially a rejection of a “one-size-fits-all approach.” Jury selection, thus,
would be specific to individual cases. Though proposed solely in the civil context, this is an interesting
argument that could also be considered for criminal trials—particularly with death penalty juries.
Gonzalez, supra note 70, at 538–39.
231. Cover, supra note 128, at 360.
232. Id. at 360.
233. Id. at 378.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 379.
236. Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1627.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 1, Art. 7

256

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:223

said that what happened to him is happening throughout Mississippi and
across America. Tragically, he’s right.237

As the State of Mississippi now apparently agrees, it is time, after six tries,
to admit that Curtis Flowers could not be given a “fair trial.”238 In its
motion to dismiss, the Attorney General’s office made no mention of the
reasoning for why the Supreme Court vacated the sixth trial’s conviction,
the numerous complaints against prosecutor Doug Evans, the shadowy
history of the investigation into Flowers in the first place, or the dark, racial
bias inherent to the case’s history; instead, the motion focused on the current
lack of evidence to prosecute Flowers a seventh time.239 The State
recognized “there is no key prosecution witness that incriminates
Mr. Flowers who is alive and available and has not had multiple, conflicting
statements in the record,” that “the only witness who offered direct
evidence of guilt recanted,” and that there were “alternative suspects with
violent criminal histories, as well as possible exculpatory evidence not
previously considered.”240
What does this mean for Curtis Flowers, a man who has been through six
trials, convicted and sentenced to death multiple times, and spent a total of
23 years in prison only for the Attorney General’s office to file for dismissal?
A man who was given conditional release under house arrest, limiting his
freedom while he waited for the Attorney General’s office to decide if it
would try him for a seventh time?241 Flowers’s wait lasted for several
months until September 4, 2020, when the Order of Dismissal of

237. Alan Bean, After 23 Years In Prison, Curtis Flowers is Free, BAPTIST NEWS GLOBAL
(Sept. 5,
2020)
https://baptistnews.com/article/after-23-years-in-prison-curtis-flowers-is-free/
[https://perma.cc/DU3X-SKJ9].
238. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Curtis Flowers Posts Bail After 23 Years and 6 Trials That Ended in Mistrial
or Overturned Convictions, CNN (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/16/us/
mississippi-curtis-flowers-bail-await-seventh-murder-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/W8LU-EH
64]. Judge Joey Loper granted the Mississippi Attorney General’s motion to dismiss the case. Id.
Parker Yesko, It’s Over: Charges Against Curtis Flowers Are Dropped, APM REPORTS (Sept. 4, 2020),
https://www.apmreports.org/episode/2020/09/04/charges-against-curtis-flowers-are-dropped [http
s://perma.cc/L3T8-FZ3L] [hereinafter Yesko, It’s Over].
239. Motion of the State of Mississippi to Dismiss the Indictment Against Curtis Giovanni
Flowers at 2, State v. Flowers, No. 2003-0071-CR (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2020).
240. Id.
241. Eliott C. McLaughlin, supra note 238.
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Indictment with Prejudice was finally signed, ending a “legal odyssey”242
for all involved and a legal tragedy for Flowers himself.243
What does this mean for the prosecutor of all Flowers’s trials, Doug
Evans? A prosecutor whose history of peremptory strikes covers twentysix years, with Black Americans struck “at nearly 4.5 times the rate [Evans
and his assistant district attorneys] struck white ones.”244 Collectively, the
Mississippi Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court found Evans guilty
of prosecutorial misconduct four times.245 Evans’s history of what some—
and what I—would call open racial bias led to Mississippi’s National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filing a civil
rights lawsuit against Evans.246 In a darkly ironic twist, this lawsuit was
dismissed on the same day Flowers became officially free.247 Despite
multiple courts acknowledging Evans’s problematic pattern of bias, his
position remains as good as it ever was. He is still chief prosecutor, reelected
after running unopposed, and, despite multiple complaints filed against him
with the Mississippi Bar Association, remains “a lawyer in good standing”
who “has not been the subject of any public disciplinary action.”248
Evans’s lack of discipline does not come as a surprise; in fact, it is
representative of the problem with the peremptory challenge system
itself.249 Evans is not the first prosecutor identified with a long history of
racial bias in jury selection, nor will he be the last. What Evans can be—
ideally—is an example of “how flawed the system is. . . . ‘Evans is not an
exception. He’s just an extreme example of what’s really wrong with the
system in terms of holding prosecutors accountable.’”250 However, what
Evans will be—without acknowledgment of systemic racism in the criminal

242. Yesko, It’s Over, supra note 239.
243. Order of Dismissal of Indictment with Prejudice, State v. Flowers, No.-2003-0071-CR
(5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2020).
244. Parker Yesko, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against DA Doug Evans, APM REPORTS (Sept. 11,
2020), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2020/09/11/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-doug-evans
[https://perma.cc/NW4U-DFE5] [hereinafter Yesko, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit].
245. See Appendix infra.
246. Yesko, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit, supra note 245.
247. Id.
248. Parker Yesko, Will Doug Evans Face Accountability?, APM REPORTS (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2020/10/14/will-doug-evans-face-accountability [https://perma
.cc/GJV5-92WZ]; E-mail from Office of General Counsel, The Mississippi Bar (on file with author).
249. Yesko, Will Doug Evans Face Accountability?, supra note 249.
250. Id.
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justice system—is an example of how the peremptory challenge system is a
destructive echo chamber.251
It would be a shame, then, if Flowers did not signal the beginning of an
attempt to find a way out of the Batson paradox. Flowers is striking in the
Court’s continued resistance to address the gulf of uncertainty the
peremptory challenge is beset by, but we are still left with one question: what
do we do with the pretextual problem? Some scholars believe it is an
inexorable facet of any peremptory challenge system due to the nature of
implicit bias, and yet others believe that the system can be refined in such a
manner as to reduce any ill-effects. For the former, the entire system must
begin with a clean slate, such as any can be achieved; for the latter, it simply
is not worth throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Inevitably, this boils
down to a question of cost—is the system worth protecting in that its
benefits outweigh its costs?
In Georgia v. McCollum,252 Justice Thomas foresaw the peremptory
collapse post-Batson: “black defendants will rue the day that this Court
ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of
Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson
peremptory strikes.”253
understood the same reality—Batson was perhaps necessary for the
immediate need to solve outrageously blatant racism in the courtroom, but
the decision was limited in that it could never solve it completely.254 For
Justice Thomas, Batson’s enforcement would inevitably lead to a crisis point
of racism and the courtroom. This was, and is, due not just to peremptory
strikes, but the jury selection process as a whole.255 However, where

251. Without attorney discipline, in particular public disciplinary action, there is no incentive
keeping Evans, or any other prosecutor, on the right side of the line. It certainly does not keep any
counsel from exercising implicit biases by offering “neutral” reasons. This results in a system
depending on self-regulation, which has already proven itself time and time again to be untenable. See
Kayley Viteo, Ethics in an Echo Chamber: Legal Ethics & the Peremptory Challenge, 11 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 90, 99 (2020) (“This is not ethics in practice, it is ethics in an echo
chamber.”).
252. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
253. Id. at 60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
254. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The
decision today will not end racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.
That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”).
255. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2262 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
the use of statistics by the majority belies the fundamental reality that Winona, Mississippi is a small
town, and the pool of potential jurors was large but interrelated, and many jurors were struck for cause).
As Justice Thomas notes in his Flowers dissent, challenges for cause also play a crucial role in the
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Justice Thomas sees cause and strikes such that “[a]ny reasonable
prosecutor”256 would make, the inadequacy of his proposal to end Batsontype inquiry is made clear by the intractable facts of Flowers. Those facts
demonstrate the system’s benefits do not and cannot outweigh its costs. In
an adversarial system guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, how can such a
system fairly produce even one instance of a man being tried six times for
the same crime? Flowers tells us decisively that there is a fundamental,
uneven balance to jury selection warranting, at minimum, eradicating the
peremptory challenge system as a whole.257
The argument for abolishing the peremptory strike, though made by
many scholars, should neither be a simple nor easy solution by any
imagination. In making this argument, I do so with the understanding that
this must entail more than merely not allowing the use of the peremptory
challenge. It must also account for Justice Thomas’s legitimate view that
race matters and involve “a candid reckoning with racism’s stubborn
intractability.”258 This includes evaluating the interplay between Black
defendants and American juries, particularly when said jury is deciding on
the death penalty.259 Thus, while Justice Thomas’s dissent in Flowers goes
to lengths which can be described as nonsensical, it should also “serve as an
invitation for creative thinking about what a ‘fair trial’ means today.”260
makeup of juries. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Before peremptory strikes even started, the venire
had gone from 42% to 28% black.”).
256. Id. at 2263 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
257. See Erin T. Campbell, Challenges Under Batson: If We Can’t Get It Right, Perhaps We Shouldn’t
Get It at All, 40 S.U.L. REV. 551, 565 (2013) (“[N]o tradition should continue if it does not serve justice
efficiently, effectively, and lawfully. Perpetration of injustice derogates, and exists contradictory to, the
justice system.”).
258. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 16.
259. See generally Nasif et al., supra note 194, at 148 (“Convening a jury that is non-representative
of the country’s population has growing implications for death penalty trials.”).
260. Frampton, What Justice Thomas Gets Right About Batson, supra note 170, at 16. In
contemplating what a fair trial might look like in a world without peremptory challenges, we can rely
on two goals: impartiality and diversity. Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859,
1871–73 (2015) (discussing how to achieve and balance two of the competing goals of jury selection).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury, and “the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Sixth Amendment to encourage a diverse jury.” Id. at 1871. Though “[a] racially diverse
jury does not necessarily equate to an impartial jury,” a systematic push for diversity in jury selection
will abate pervasive discrimination and lead to increasingly more impartial juries due to “a group
containing enough variety of life experiences to add to the richness of understanding of the case and
to deliberations.” Id. at 1871, 1873. Acknowledging the way in which peremptory challenges obstruct
impartiality, and removing them as a possible method of jury selection will “provide a means for
eradicating discrimination during jury selection . . . .” Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1047 (1995).
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Calling for the abolition of the peremptory challenge system is
undoubtedly a controversial argument to make. As those who support it
constantly state, it is revered as a tool for counsel during trial. However, its
history is fraught when compared to today’s implementation—it is now
granted to defendants and prosecutors alike, its application entirely rife with
frustration, and any attempts to provide remedies for discrimination
fractured across a racial divide. Though the Court would like to believe
Batson has solved the problem of racially motivated jury exclusion, “the
practice has been central to criminal adjudication throughout American
history [and] . . . remains so now.”261 Contrary to Justice Thomas’s view,
the peremptory system, regardless of Batson’s attempted fixes and beyond,
works only for white prospective jurors and against anyone else. We must,
therefore, move forward with a system that produces juries of “peers” by
random selection,262 representing the diverse experiences and lives of the
criminal defendants in the nation’s courts, with the shared goal of a truly fair
trial for all.

261. Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, supra note 12, at 1623.
262. See Tetlow, supra note 260, at 1939–40 (“A system of random selection better protects the
basic democratic principle of citizen participation in juries without interference from a process
designed to weed out bias . . . . More random selection would create juries that represent the
public . . . .”).
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V. APPENDIX
Breakdown by race of prosecutorial peremptory strikes per trial.
PROSPECTIVE
JURORS

Black
#1

5

White
31

STRIKES
USED

Total
36

263

11

264

STRUCK
JURORS

FINAL
JURY

Black

White

Black

White

5

6

0

12

2

1

11

5

265

#2

5

25

30

7

#3

17

28

45

15

15

0

1

11

#4

16

20

36

11

11

0

5

7

#5

No data available.

3

9

266

#6

6

20

26

6

5

1

1

11

T
O
T
A
L

48

124

173

50

41

9

11

61

TRIAL
RESULT

RESULT
ON
APPEAL

Convicted,
death
sentence

Reversed,
Miss.
Sup. Ct. prosecutor
misconduct

Mistrial

N/A

Convicted,
death
sentence

Vacated,
U.S. Sup.
Ct. - Batson
violations

263. Batson Challenge - JURY OUT at 233–35, State v. Flowers, CR-97-369 (Cir. Ct. Lee
Cnty. 1997).
264. Selection of Jury - JURY OUT at 1362–63, State v. Flowers, CR-97-372 (Cir. Ct. Harrison
Cnty. 1999).
265. Prosecutor Evans attempted to strike five Black jurors, but a Batson challenge for one
juror was sustained and he was allowed on the final jury panel. Selection of Jury - JURY OUT at 1362–
63, State v. Flowers, CR-97-372 (Cir. Ct. Harrison Cnty. 1999).
266. Craft, supra note 193.
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